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WINDS OF CHANGE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE WORLD'S
SEARCH FOR STABLE DEMOCRACY
by Rodney A. Smolla* and Darlene P. Bradberry**
I.
In November 1992, the German government summoned the citizens of Germany
to stage a march through Berlin in a massive demonstration of the nation's commitment
to tolerance and human rights. The march was scheduled to coincide with the anniversary
of two events in German history, one monstrous and one triumphant: the commencement
in 1938 of the Nazi Kristallnacht pogrom against Jews, and the 1989 fall of the )erlin
Wall. The march should have been a celebration of peace and hope, a signal to the world
that the reunited Germany was dedicated to equality, the rule of law, and protection of
human dignity. Indeed the German government and the vast majority of the German
people are so dedicated.
But the march ended in ruin. Radical reactionary youths pelted the marchers with
racist chants, catcalls, tomatoes, eggs, and paint bombs. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
was forced to abandon his place at the head of the march as anarchist protesters - known
as autonomen - began throwing eggs and stones at him. German President Richard von
Weizsacher was hit by eggs thrown by the protestors, and was forced to cut short his
speech - an eloquent plea for German citizens to condemn and take action against the
rising tide of hate crimes and anti-foreigner violence sweeping the nation. Despite the
show of solidarity among most of Germany's political, business, labor, and religious
leaders, the peaceful demonstration in Berlin's Lustgarten Square ended in a debacle of
hate. Ignatz Bubis, the leader of Germany's Jewish community, took the microphone and
chastised the crowd: "I am ashamed of what has happened here. We are not in 1938, but
in 1992."' The event in its way captured many of the currents of modem times.
There are, first, the currents of optimism. It must be remembered that the march
itself would have been almost unimaginable five years earlier, for this was a march in a
unified Germany, through a Berlin without a wall. The revolutions in Eastern and Central
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Europe and in the former Soviet Union ended communist statism. When these revolutions
occurred, citizens in nations around the world seemed swept up in a mass euphoria. Winds
of change appeared to be swirling across the globe, restless winds of democracy, self-
determination, and openness, stirrings that crossed international borders and cultural
traditions, as the peoples of the world began to assert entitlements to the enjoyment of
fundamental human rights. In late 1989 the Earth seemed to be in the midst of an
extraordinary renaissance of democracy, freedom of expression, cultural tolerance, open
economic markets, and pluralism, experiencing movements toward democracy and
openness unimagined only a year before, as what was once unthinkable has become
commonplace.
Yet the November 1992 march through Berlin also captured currents of
foreboding. Three years after the revolutions, the celebrations of 1989 had given way to
a sense of collective hangover. A jittery world seemed unsure of its future.
The signals of misgiving are plentiful.
There appear to be two seismic earth-forces at work, pushing and pulling, like
volcanoes and shifting continental plates. On the one hand, the world is witnessing a
centrifugal force, a force that is pushing societies apart, breaking them up into smaller and
smaller units of ethnic and racial identity and sovereignty. Within many of the newly
emerging democracies, it is beginning to appear more difficult to make a nation than to
make a revolution. Forces are threatening to pull Ethiopia apart, breaking it up into ethnic
states for Eritreans, or Oromos, or Tigreans. The Soviet Union is gone, dissolving to
republics and autonomous regions based on what Russians call nationalities, and
Americans call ethnicity. Ethnic and religious differences have destroyed the artificial
construct that was once Yugoslavia, ending in horrible acts of ethnic cleansing that ravage
fundamental notions of humanity. Canadians voted to reject a constitutional reform,
creating the distinct possibility that the nation Canada as the world has known it could
dissolve.
These forces are at work in the United States. The people of Los Angeles have
long felt ethnic tremors. After the Rodney King verdict they felt a quake. And they ask,
like all Americans should ask, can the nation pull itself together and avoid the big one?
Whether the visual images are taken from the films of Spike Lee, from the amateur video
that caught the racist beating of Rodney King, or from the scenes broadcast from Los
Angeles on the weekend after the King verdict was announced, it is clear that American
society is nowhere near achieving any sense of racial or ethnic understanding, or peace.
These breaking-apart pressures being felt around the world are, in an ironic way,
accelerated by a very different kind of pressure that is also at work. These are the pres-
sures of the marketplace - indeed, of the global marketplace. In a true global
marketplace, nations as we once knew them might not matter as much as they once did.
For if people can market their goods and services in regional or world markets that cross
national borders, many of the economic imperatives that fostered the existence of
traditional nation-states begin to dissolve.
And so the traditional nation-state has experienced pressures in two directions.
Its sovereignty is threatened from the inside, by demands for self-determination - indeed,
often, for sovereignty itself, from smaller internal entities - often organized along lines
of ethnic group identity. And the traditional nation-state is threatened by pressures from
the outside - pressures toward the ceding of sovereignty to international confederations,
such as the European Community or the United Nations.
[Vol. 1:2
WINDS OF CHANGE
These forces are destabalizing and frightening. They give rise to the impulse to
retreat. Democracy may be made to appear too menacing. Open markets may be made to
appear too volatile. Tolerance for foreigners, for immigrants, for refugees, may be made
to appear too much a luxury in pressing times. And so it is not surprising that resentment
against new ethnic migration would erupt into violence in both Los Angeles
2 and Berlin. 3
Nor is it any surprise that among the nations of the world, the momentum toward greater
economic and political union has stalled, if not moved into outright retrograde.4
Against this ambiguous and convoluted backdrop, the Institute of Bill of Rights
Law, with the generous support of the Henry Jackson Foundation, sponsored its "Winds
of Change" task force, bringing together scholars from around the world to reflect on the
nature of these evolving events, and to address them in light of the "great issues" of
nation-building and constitution-making.
The Institute of Bill of Rights Law, and the William and Mary Bill of Rights
Journal, are institutions bearing names implying a mission limited primarily to exploration
of matters pertinent to the American Bill of Rights. From its inception, however, the
Institute of Bill of Rights Law has taken a broad view of its mandate, treating all issues
of "constitutionalism" as fair game for academic exploration. The reasons for this
latitudinous vision of mission are worth articulating, both to explain why this collection
of materials appears in this journal sponsored by this Institute, and to explain why the
destiny of the American Bill of Rights is linked inextricably to the destiny of progress in
the protection of human rights world-wide.
Viewed first from a domestic perspective, the Institute has adopted the position
that it would not treat the American constitutional experience as something to be chopped
up into artificially self-contained topical or disciplinary sub-components. The Bill of
Rights does not travel in its own orbit, unaffected by other constitutional principles, such
as those embodied in the Equal Protection Clause, or in our concepts of federalism and
separation of powers. Thus the Institute has over the years conducted many programs that
cut across all of these doctrinal boundaries.
If the Bill of Rights does not travel in its own doctrinal orbit, it is also true that
the meaning of the American Constitution is not the exclusive domain of American
constitutional law. Our constitutional experience is not merely the experience of law
professors and law students, or lawyers and judges. The Institute's focus has thus been
deliberately inter-disciplinary, serving as a forum and catalyst for research for scholars of
religion, history, political science, economics, sociology, journalism, philosophy, arts,
letters, and even sciences. Reinforcing this intentionally eclectic taste, the Institute has
2 The violence in Los Angeles following the Rodney King verdict was, at least in part, the result of
tensions among different ethnic groups in Los Angeles. Jack Miles recently argued that the violence in Los
Angeles was connected to United States immigration policies, and that it largely concerned conflicts between
Blacks and Latinos. Jack Miles, Blacks v. Browns, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1992, at 41.
' In 1992, Germany has experienced more than 1,800 attacks against foreigners, 14 times as many
assaults as in 1990. See Fischer, supra note I, at Al.
4 Among the symptoms of the retreat were renewed threats of serious trade wars between the United
States and Europe, while the Maastricth Treaty, which would have created greater unity in the European
Community foundered on political and economic disagreement among the states of Europe. These historical
forces never move in perfect unison, however, and the counter-tensions toward greater economic unity were
also visible - as in the successful negotiation by Mexico, Canada, and the United States of the North
American Free Trade Agreement. However, in light of the rejection of the constitutional referendum in
Canada, and the election of Bill Clinton as President of the United States, it is not fully clear what the future
fate of this agreement will be.
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placed an emphasis on involving not merely scholarly voices from these disciplines, but
the actual practitioners of the various arts and sciences that give them life. And so we
have welcomed not merely journalism scholars, but journalists, not merely political
scientists, but politicians, not merely religious studies professors, but religious leaders, and
so on. This is done out of an abiding sense that in contemporary life, these various
perspectives actually constitute the core substance of the American constitutional
experience. How is one to talk about freedom of speech in modern times, for example,
without talking of artistic freedom? And how is one to talk about artistic freedom without
talking about art? And how is one to talk about art without talking to artists?5 This
example is merely emblematic of the larger lesson, that one cannot talk with full richness
of constitutional developments concerning the issues of the day (whatever they may be
- abortion, affirmative action, the right to die with dignity, the war power - it makes
no difference) without a spacious sense of the intellects and ideas that comprise American
constitutional discourse.
This philosophy naturally led the Institute to an even wider supposition: The
American constitutional experience should be interpreted as part of the larger march of
constitutional theory and practice around the world.
American constitutional history is certainly, at minimum, a dialogue of one
generation of Americans to the next. This point was made recently with great eloquence
by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey:6
Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of Americans
to us and then to future generations. It is a coherent succession. Each generation
must learn anew that the Constitution's written terms embody ideas and
aspirations that must survive more ages than one.'
In the final analysis, however, the American Constitution is also a dialogue with
the rest of the world. And it is a dialogue. Our constitutional history can instruct the
world, for good and for evil. American mythology, from the Puritans to the presidency
of Ronald Reagan, has invoked the image of America as a shining "city on a hill," a
beacon illuminating the world.8 And to be sure, there is much in our constitutional life
that has weathered time well, can truly be accounted a success, and offers itself for
possible adoption by other societies.
But there was always a certain self-absorption to this image of city on a hill, and
what is worse, a certain disconnection with reality. Our "living Constitution" has not
been the story of utopia. Americans have purchased civil rights and civil liberties at great
cost, and only through that struggle have those rights ultimately gained purchase in our
democracy. In that struggle Americans have learned much from the parallel struggles of
other nations. The currents of philosophy and policy that circulate in other cultures filter
through our own, and are absorbed, in part, in our constitutional bloodstream. Indeed, for
See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 172-78 (1992).
6 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
Id. at 2833 (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., announcing the judgment of the Court and
delivering the opinion of the Court in part).




many Americans, it was specially invigorating that on the 200th anniversary of the
American Bill of Rights, constitutional ferment should be so prominent in other societies.
The revolutions in Eastern Europe were particularly exhilarating for the American psyche:
here were people whom we could observe with the immediacy of modern television for
whom rights mattered, and for whom ideas mattered. Here were people taking to the
streets, blocking the paths of tanks, locking arms, waving flags, writing manifestos, all in
the name of democracy and human rights. Here were people invoking our Bill of Rights
for their own liberation.
And when these events were over, and that nation-building began, here were
people anxious to talk with us. They did not want us to talk at them, but with them. They
wanted to talk about the fundamental questions of governmental and societal organization.
These discussions were often scholarly but not "academic." The solutions sought were
practical, immediate, and necessary. In the process of that dialogue, conducted in many
forums by many institutions over the course of the last several years, societies have
learned more about each other, and about themselves. It was in the spirit of that tradition
that this Winds of Change task force was commenced.
The actual dynamics of the task force meetings underscored the difficulty of
international dialogue and the great need for more such efforts. The barriers to thoughtful
debate were often formidable. Not barriers of language translation - they were the
easiest to overcome - but barriers of value and idea translation. Throughout the
conference there were moments of collegial consensus and moments of fierce division.
There was always a dynamic, however, of diplomatic skirmish at work - a sort of uneasy
testiness and defensiveness - which had to be worked through and resolved, area-by-
area, before genuine progress toward quality discourse could be achieved. At times
breakthroughs were made, at other times debate ended in stalemate. There was always the
sense, however, that this type of dialogue does not take place enough, that it ought not
be this difficult, that the world would benefit if it were more commonplace.
II.
Why are democratic movements successful in some nations and not in others?
Why are elemental notions of human rights - free expression, security from political
prosecution, observance of religious tolerance, respect for racial and ethnic equality,
freedom from torture, safety against arbitrary criminal search, seizure, and arrest - able
to take root and flourish in some nations but not in others? Is the experience of every
culture unique, or are there lessons that the peoples of the world can learn from one
another? Do nations with long traditions of democracy and respect for human rights have
something to contribute to the evolution of those values world-wide, or will efforts to
"export" those established traditions be viewed with contempt by nations in flux, as
paternalistic or condescending attempts to impose legal and social norms irrelevant to the
indigenous patterns of life of other nations? Are there any necessary cultural or economic
preconditions to democracy and respect for civil liberties? Are the successes of those
values in any given nation largely random and accidental, so much wrapped up in the
unique history of that nation as to not be "suitable for export?"
The papers presented by the scholars brought together for this conference present
a rich mixture of responses to these issues. Several of the scholars in this task force
observe that when a country begins its democratic tradition, the spirit of compromise
1992]
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between political parties is paramount. Democracy cannot be established by force. The
main political parties of a country must instead learn to work together to establish a
government which best reflects the needs of the people. Spain and Hungary both
experienced unprecedented compromises between diverse and numerous political parties
after their revolutions. In Hungary, following the fall of the socialist government, the
political parties worked with the former State Party to form a new government while
maintaining the peace. Professor Antal Visegridy states that:
The Hungarian transformation was also unprecedented because
revolutionary changes were accomplished in a peaceful and orderly manner and
were reached by negotiations that preserved the governing ability of the central
power. Unlike East Germany and Romania, in Hungary, no one destroyed the state
machinery or the institutional political power. Furthermore, the state machinery
did not become paralyzed, as had occurred in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Instead,
the central state and party power machinery were dismantled following the
agreements between the opposition and the governing political forces, safeguarding
the economic and social reproductive capacity of the country.9
Was this spirit of compromise facilitated by the countries' previous experience
with a communist government? Can such peaceful compromise be duplicated elsewhere?
Professor Santiago Sanchez Gonzalez writes that in Spain:
In order to ensure that the program of economic reform would not be opposed
by the representative of the working class parties, [Adolfo] Suirez decided to
invite the leaders of practically all major political forces to his official residence
at the Moncloa palace to discuss his economic proposal....
The Moncloa Pacts were signed on October 24, 1977 by the representa-
tives of all the main political parties. They amounted to a cooperation agreement
between right and left in order to improve the economic situation and thereby
avoid a political backslide. Although the reforms, particularly in the social field,
promised by the government in exchange for the opposition's peaceful
acceptance of the austere measures were not completely fulfilled, the Moncloa
Pacts were temporarily successful in the economic sphere and prevented a
regression in the transitional process."
Although the scholars in the task force agree that democracy is the most stable
form of government, they do not agree on what form of democracy is the most viable for
their own countries. In their papers several of the scholars relate how alien American
democratic principles appear to the people of their countries.
Russians have a long experience of being servants to a powerful state. Professor
Svetlana A. Chervonnaya describes Russian history as the repeated rejection of
9 Antal Visegrady, Transition to Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: Experiences of a Model
Country - Hungary, I WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 245, 250 (1992).
10 Santiago Sanchez Gonzalez, Emergent New Democracies: The Case of Spain, I WM. & MARY BILL
OF RTS. J. 267, 281-82 (1992).
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democracy. Again and again, Russians have chosen to be subjects instead of citizens. She
describes the entrenched mentality:
A subject is responsible to the state, serves it, and obeys its orders. A citizen is
responsible to himself and to the nation, not to whatever administration happens
to be in power. To a subject, the state is an irrational, external force. To a
citizen, the state is an understandable mechanism used to administer the country,
established with the citizen's active participation and operating under the
citizen's control. A subject depends upon the state for the satisfaction of basic
needs and is expected to feel grateful for the very right of existence. A citizen
provides for personal needs and, in exchange for benefits from the state,
relinquishes some rights.
Throughout history, Russians have been deprived of any real sense of
citizenship, and thus an understanding of the inalienable nature of their rights.
Memorizing a list of one's inalienable rights does not guarantee an
understanding of those rights. In the United States, this understanding took two
centuries to formulate, even with a background of democratic tradition dating to
the Magna Carta. For Russians, an understanding of the citizen with a simple,
clear-cut, and rational relationship with his country is still incomprehensible.
Real-life problems and opportunities are changing this, however. Will Russians
realize the historic chance of finally becoming full and equal citizens of their
country and not the subjects of their state?"
For Russians, then, establishing a democracy is as much a struggle of the soul
as a struggle over structure.
Much the same psychology is described in the powerful essay on Puerto Rico by
Professor Antonio Fernos."2 Although Puerto Rico has a "democratic government," it
is not Puerto Rico's government, but the government of the United States. Instead of
evolving into a democracy itself, Puerto Rico was given a democratic government of U.S.
design. The result is that:
Regarding public law institutions, Puerto Ricans simply do not live by
a Republican form of government having seperation of powers. It exists only in
theory, not in "official" government action. Political behavior and discourse in
Puerto Rico is still patterned after a monarchial, parliamentary system, of
government subordinate to considerations of party, friendship, family, group or
regional relationships, humanity and charity.
This customary system is the real one, because the great institutions of
the democratic, constitutional system of government were: (1) imposed, but not
I Svetlana A. Chervonnaya, Critical Choices of Russia's Democracy I WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J.
227, 233-34 (1992).
12 Antonio Fernos, Trading Winds in Puerto Rico: The Dawn of Self-Determination Shines on a Legal
System, I WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 285 (1992).
1992]
WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
taught, consulted, or developed by the people themselves, for themselves; and (2)
because those who brought it and proclaimed it did not practice it, and then later
only pretended to observe it. That is why the old system still exists, yet that is
also why this state of affairs cannot last longer, and the winds must change.'
3
Why would a country with a democratic government tolerate that government yet
choose not to participate in it? How can Puerto Ricans prepare themselves for their own
kind of democracy?
Even Hungary, a country that is functioning democratically, feels the need for
democratic instincts in its people. Antal Visegrddy writes:
We must build democracy not only in institutions, organizations, and laws, but
inside ourselves as well. Without respect for moral and political values, no moral
politics exist, and there is no political nation which is built from below.
Democracy must be built in the souls, in the emotions, in the everyday life. Only
a democracy that is based on morals and everyday practice can be strong."
Apparently, for a democracy to work, its citizens need to be engendered with the
democratic spirit. But which comes first? How can people learn the spirit of democracy
without first experiencing it? Can the spirit of democracy be taught, or must it be self-
taught?
Japan presents an interesting example for analysis. Although it established its
own democratic government, it did so partially at the behest of its people, but mostly in
response to international pressure. Professor Yasutomo Morigiwa recognizes in Japan the
lingering of a mind-set he calls tribalism:
In the typical tribal society, the code of the clan or tribe must be upheld
without questioning the purpose of the rules; changing the rules through mutual
discussion and resolve is impossible. If there is a conflict, the elders intervene
and mediate. Resorting to the judicial system and arguing the case in a court of
law is similarly not an option; neither the concept of law nor the judicial system
necessary for implementing law exists in this society. A society based on and
embodying the rule of law must exist for such a legal system to function therein.
The tribal society as we perceive it is anything but such a society.'5
Several of the scholars address the concept of government according to "the rule
of law." What is this concept? Is it a necessary component of a democratic government?
The role of ethnic identity, and the problems of resolving ethnic conflicts, are
prominent themes in the papers. Professor Alemante Selassie argues forcefully that in
some emerging democracies, such as Ethiopia, the formulas of traditional liberal
democratic thought may not be adequate to address the task.'
6
13 Id. at 294 (citation omitted).
"4 Visegrady, supra note 9, at 256-57 (citation omitted).
15 Yasutomo Morigiwa, The Laws of a Nation: The Essential Formula for a Liberal and Democratic
State, I WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 187, 195-96 (1992).
16 Alemante G. Selassie, Ethiopia: Problems and Prospects for Democracy, I WM. & MARY BILL OF
RTS. J. 205 (1992).
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A major hurdle for many emerging democratic governments is the existence of
friction among multiple ethnic groups within a country. Many countries grapple with the
problem of preserving national unity while at the same time recognizing ethnic identity.
Perhaps because Western European countries were relatively homogenous ethnically,
liberal democratic thought did not tend to treat ethnicity as requiring recognition from the
state. However, in countries that are divided by language and culture, the recognition of
ethnic identity may be an important prerequisite to national peace. The African nations
and Russia both face the issue of how to balance the relationship between state,
individual, and ethnic community. Can national, individual and ethnic rights be balanced,
or must one prevail over the others? Svetlana Chervonnaya writes that:
A fundamental principle of the system Russia inherited was Stalin's
definition of a nation as an ethnically homogenous community with exclusive
rights to a territory with fixed borders. This definition resulted in a rigid
hierarchy of ethnic communities with a corresponding hierarchy of administra-
tive-territorial divisions....
What is the future of ethnonationalism in "nation-states" where the
"native" population constitutes less than a majority? Can the sovereignty of the
Tatar Republic be interpreted as the result of self-determination of the Tatars
when eighty percent of its members reside outside this republic? What will be
the price of social peace in the Baltic republics with the rights of their sizable
"non-native" populations, almost forty percent of Estonia and fifty percent in
Latvia, severely abridged? What will happen if the most alarming Russian
ethnonationalism becomes realized so that a "Russian republic" is created on the
territory of the current Russia despite the existence of more than one hundred
ethnic groups? Can a civil society evolve within the limits of ethnic nationhood
when the state becomes a vehicle for just one ethnic group? 7
Professor Chervonnaya suggests that Russia should use the United States as an
example and place individual rights in a position of priority over group rights. Professor
Selassie, on the other hand, observes that in Africa, the Western assimilation strategy has
not succeeded. He advocates a new approach for African Ethiopia and other African
nations - one that recognizes both individual and the collective rights of ethnic groups:
... Ethiopia should consider alternative constitutional models that accommodate
ethnic diversity without impairing national unity. If the federal idea is to be
effective, it requires fostering an awareness that each region, by itself, is
relatively insignificant vis-a-vis the whole. One way to achieve this is to split the
large regions into several smaller units, taking ethnicity into consideration, but
also considering history, economic viability, and other criteria calculated to
encourage a feeling of interdependence and mutual cooperation ....
"7 Chervonnaya, supra note 11, at 239-41.
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Little, if at all, in the way of democratic progress can be expected amid
ethnic conflict and competition. 8
In the end, what strikes one most about the collection of scholarly works in this
volume is the complex interplay of "things we have in common" with "things that make
us unique." The collection reveals that there are indeed many issues common to all
constitutional democracies, and that societies have much to learn from the traditions and
strategies of others. Yet in the final analysis, stable democracies respectful of the basic
human rights of others must emerge from the unique history, culture, and traditions of
each society, and most importantly, the values of democracy and human rights must be
absorbed into the ethos of the people.
"s Selassie, supra note 16, at 225-26.
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